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ABSTRACT
During the 1990s, the competition law arena witnessed a huge competition laws adaptation from
developing countries creating a fertile soil for scholars and practitioners of competition law to
study such a phenomena. The literature mainly corresponds to the inevitable lack of enforcement
of such competition legislation within developing countries. In the scholars’ attempt to address
the routes of the problem, several arguments have been formed. The most important mainstream
arguments focus on two different scale arguments. The first argument focuses on the preenactment phase that can be called “the best model”. While the second argument focuses on the
post-enactment phase which concentrates its argument on analyzing the “enforcement
mechanisms”. The “best model” argument provides two different points of view. The advocates
of the first point of view argue that developing countries should transplant the competition law
universal norms; in other words, they should transplant Western competition legislation. On the
other hand, advocates of the context theory argue that developing countries should seek the
contextualization approach that harness such universal/western competition law norms to the
developing countries own context. Despite the fact that both “best model” and “enforcement
mechanisms” seems to be theoretically different, they are related to each other in one important
aspect that seems not to be recognized by the two schools’ advocates. This important fact is the
role of “political determinants” of the relevant developing country. This paper focuses on the
Egyptian competition law as one of the developing countries. The paper takes a different
approach than mainstream literature by emphasizing the “political determinants” within the
context of a developing country due to its central and important role in determining both the
“best model” to be adopted in the pre-enactment phase and on the enforcement phase as well. In
support of this approach, the paper magnifies the role played by “political determinants” as the
third dimension that moves everything within the competition law arena, including competition
policy, legislation model, and thus enforcement mechanism. The Egyptian case reflects the fact
that “political determinants” should be examined more closely as it is one of the main reasons for
the enforcement problems faced by developing countries.
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I.

Introduction

During the past two decades, developing countries have adopted competition laws with the aim
of protecting their local markets from anticompetitive behaviors and regulating the competition
process within their markets.1 The significant increase of developing countries adoption of
competition laws that has taken place in the last two decades has created a phenomena worth
studying. Such phenomena are subject to extensive academic discussions to identify why
developing countries started, suddenly, to adopt competition laws and how they adopted such
legislation. In addition, the question, of why and how developing countries face problems in
adopting and enforcing such competition laws has also been subject to extensive discussion.2
On the first question regarding why the developing countries were suddenly interested in
adopting competition legislation, the mainstream literature advocates for the strong correlation
between the presence of effective competition legislation and economic development and
efficiency.3While others justify that international institutions and Western trade partners exert
pressures upon the developing countries to adopt competition legislation.4 Despite, the
acceptable argument of the correlation between the adoption of competition legislation and
economy developmental and efficiency, the literature indicates that developing countries do not

1

Gal, Michal S., The Ecology of Antitrust: Preconditions for Competition Law Enforcement in Developing
Countries. Competition, Competitiveness and Development, 20-38, at 1 (2004). Available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=665181.[hereinafter referred to as Gal, The Ecology of Antitrust]. For full details regarding
the developing countries enacted their competition laws during this era, see Dina Waked, Antitrust Enforcement in
Developing Countries: Reasons for Enforcement & Non-Enforcement using Resource-bases Evidence (2011),
available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2044047.
2
See MICHAL S. GAL ET AL, THE ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF DEVELOPING JURISDICTIONS: THEIR
IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPETITION LAW 1 (Michal S. Gal ET ALeds,.Edward El Gar 2015). Dina Waked, Antitrust
Enforcement in Developing Countries: Reasons for Enforcement & Non-Enforcement using resource –based
Evidence. M. Gal, ‘Antitrust in a Globalized Economy: The Unique Enforcement Challenges Faced by Small and by
Developing Countries’ (2009) 33(1) FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 10; See, also, D.J. GERBER, GLOBAL
COMPETITION: LAW, MARKETS, AND GLOBALIZATION 248 (Oxford University Press, 2010).
3
Dina Waked, Competition Law in the Developing World: The Why and How of Adoption and Its Implications for
International Competition Law, 1 GLOBAL ANTITRUST REV. 69 (2008); see also EINER EL HAUGE AND DAMIEN
GERADIN; GLOBAL ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS; 2nd ed.;(Hart Publishing, 2011) (2007).See also, Bernard
Hoekman; ‘Competition Policy and the Global Trading System:A Developing-Country Perspective’; (March 1997);
1735 The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper; 1. See also D.J. GERBER, Supra note 2.
4
See for instance, MAHER M. DABBAH, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE COMPETITION LAW, 292-93
(Cambridge, 2015). See also Dina Waked, supra note 1 at 2; Francisco Marcos, Do Developing Countries need
Competition Law and Policy? 3 (2006). World Trade Organization; paper of 18 September 1988;
WT/WGTCP/W/80.

fully enforce their competition laws.5 Rodriguez and Williams add, “Antitrust laws have been on
the books of several developing countries for a long time, but they have done little to reduce
anticompetitive behavior. This suggests that the laws have been ignored.”6 This leads the
literature to give more focus to the question of why developing countries do not enforce their
competition law.7
In an attempt to address the above question, two main arguments were formulated. . The first
argument is what we can call the “pre-enactment” argument which focuses on identifying the
“model” that developing countries should adopt as it is perceived to be the main reason behind
the non-enforcement of competition law in developing countries. While the second argument can
be called the “post-enactment” argument which focuses on the difficulties faced by developing
countries on the “enforcement” level rendering a special analysis of the enforcement
mechanisms. In each of the arguments, there are sub-arguments within. For instance, in the preenactment argument there are two main positions, namely transplantation and contextualization.
In this sense, an important question arises: Is there only one standard competition law “model” in
which all States adopting free market economy must enact or are there different “models” that
can be adopted? If there is more than one model, what is the best model of competition law that
can contribute to the developing countries developmental goals; is it mere transplantation of the
Western developed countries’ laws or contextualizing such laws to fit the specifics of each
developing country? In order to find the right answers for such questions, the next chapter
presents the controversial global debate regarding what is the best competition law model to be
enacted by developing countries.
On the other hand, the post-enactment is built on the implicit assumption that developing
countries enjoy characteristics that are different from the western or developed countries and

5

See for instance, Gal Et Al, supra note, 2; see also, Michal S. Gal, When the Going Get Tight: Institutional
Solutions when Antitrust Enforcement Resources are Scarce, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 417, 417-18 (2010).
6
A. E. Rodriguez and Mark D. Williams, The Effectiveness of proposed Antitrust Programs for Developing
Countries, 19 INT’L L. & COM. REG. 209,223 (1994), cited in Dina Waked, supra note 1 at 3.
7
Id; supra note 1 at 1, Gal, the Ecology of Antitrust; Dina Waked, Do Developing Countries Enforce Their Antitrust
Laws? A Statistical Study of Public Antitrust Enforcement in Developing Countries (Dec. 22, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript),available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2044047; see also, Gal, Michal S. and Fox, Eleanor M., "Drafting
competition law for developing jurisdictions: learning from experience, New York University Law and Economics
Working Papers. Paper 374 (2014) available at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_lewp/374. GAL ET AL, supra note 2 at 1.
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thus enforcement problems are likely to occur irrespective of whether the law was a
transplantation of a best practice, or contextualized from the outer the specific circumstances of
the country. This theory implicitly recognizes that context matters even if it is not a preenactment.
This paper focuses on the “pre-enactment” argument as the starting point due to the significant
effect the adopted law model and its wording imposes on the enforcement of the legislation
itself. This paper will then focus on a very important factor that both arguments seems to
underestimate which is the role of the “political determinants” within a developing country and
its impact on the “will” of the ruling regime during the enactment phase. In fact, the political
determinant is the governing factor as it is the game changer when it comes to either the adoption
of a certain model or its enforcement. Political determinants are the reality constraints affecting
decision making within the country. It is all about the relation between the centers of authority
and money within a country. It is a web of common interests between oligarchs, powerful
institutions, political and economic centers of power influencing the decision making process to
ensure the preservation of their own interest at any expense even at the public’s interest. Each of
the power centers exercises significant pressure in an attempt to increase and preserve their
favored positions and their self-interest with no regard to the public’s interests. Such practices
and conflicts over the distribution of the pie usually end up in a compromise between the centers
of power and money. The ruling regimes in such countries cannot deviate from preserving the
status quo or otherwise it faces the possibility of being ousted. Corruption, favoritism, cronyism,
nepotism, lack of democracy, lack of short and long term economic policies are all symptoms of
the impact of an active political determinant intervention.
It is argued in this paper that “political determinant” is in fact a crucial and important factor to
understand the problems faced by developing countries, more specifically Egypt, when it comes
to the competition law enforcement.8 The “political determinants” is the determinant factor of the
8

The groundbreaking work on introducing the “political determinants” as an important factor to understand and
analyze the cross-national divergence in corporate governance system has been done by Mark Roe. His thesis
illustrates the importance of including the political factors while studying and analyzing the cross-national
divergence in corporate governance paradigms and ownership as it provides significant value more than the
mainstream plain legal and economic theories do. He adds that such domestic political forces determine the share
ownership structure, the institutions of cooperate governance and the advancement of the securities market. For

3

model of competition law to be adopted and at the same time, it is the determinant factor of the
enforcement level and more importantly, it is the reason behind the decision of adopting
competition legislation in the first place even before choosing the model. In other words,
“political determinants” can be perceived as the third dimension shaking and moving the
compass of the competition law adoption and its enforcement back and forth. Due to such an
important role, the “political determinants” play, this paper argues that the real phenomena worth
studying is the “political determinants” within a developing state as it is construed to be one of
the most important reasons behind the occurrence of the enforcement problems that many
developing countries suffer from.
In order to achieve such an academic goal, the paper will proceed as follows. First, the paper will
demonstrate that existing accounts cannot explain the weak record of enforcement, and the
substance of particular provisions of the Egyptian competition law. To demonstrate that Egyptian
competition law is deviating from the global recognized best practices, a comparison of the
Egyptian competition law with US and EU law with respect to specific issues must take place.
First, the standard of evidence in horizontal agreements will be contested between the three
jurisdictions. Second, the paradigm of the competition law and its institutional apparatus will be
examined as well. Finally, the immunity system will be analyzed and examined. The outcome of
this comparative analysis will be examined to assess whether the Egyptian competition law is
signing outside the flock because it is contextualized to fit Egypt’s own unique characteristics to
achieve developmental goals by addressing the best interest of the public or otherwise. The final
outcome will prove that the Egyptian competition law is in isolation of the best practices
approach as it is contextualized not to the best interest of the pubic and economy advancement as
promoted by the pro-contextualization theory scholars, but rather to the best interest of the ruling
regime along with its oligarchs monopolizing Egypt’s economy and political arena. It will also
show that the ruling regime adopted the Egyptian competition legislation only to satisfy the
Egyptian external trade partners while simultaneously ensuring that such legislation would not
shrink the distribution of the pie as designed by the “political determinants” over the years.

example, MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE
IMPACT (Oxford University Press, 2003); Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV. L. REV.,
460 (2006).

4

Chapter II details the controversial debate between the economists and practitioners of
competition law around the world regarding the “model” vs “models, “transplantation” vs
“contextualization” with regard to the best model of competition law for developing countries. In
addition, it describes the important factors that should be considered while choosing the best
competition law model for developing countries according to the contextualization model.
Chapter III compares specific provisions of the Egyptian Competition law and US and EU law to
demonstrate that the Egyptian law is deviating from the global competition law best practices.
Chapter IV illustrates how the “political determinants” played a fundamental role in
marginalizing the Egyptian competition law by examining the Egyptian competition paradigm
according to the contextualization theory.

5

II.

Why and how developing countries face problems in adopting and enforcing their
competition laws

This chapter starts with a literature review regarding the two main arguments over the best model
of competition law for developing countries, transplanted or contextualized model.

A. What is the Best for the Developing Countries, Transplantation VS
Contextualization
The extraordinary expansion of competition legislation enactment within the developing
countries and failures in enforcing such legislations created mixed and different arguments
regarding what is in favor of developing countries.9The most important mainstream arguments
suggest two different approaches the “transplantation” vs “contextualization”. The last part of
this chapter will provide analysis to the “contextualization” approach by examining the important
governing factors of such approach that should influence each developing state’s competition
law.
Justification of the transplantation argument can be summarized as follows. i) transplantation
generally increases legal certainty due to the long interpretation of the law ought to be
transplanted as it has been enforced for a long time and thus enjoys a history of implementation,
enforcement, and academic discussions; ii) on the trade level, it can also encourage the foreign
direct investments into the transplanting state market; And finally iii) it increases the possibility
of cooperation between competition authorities in case of cross-border infringement.10
According to the supporters of the transplantation approach, such cooperation is most likely to
occur in transplantation approach than alternative approaches.

9

See, for instance, Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust, Economic Development and Poverty: The Other Path, 13 SW. JL &
TRADE AM. 211 (2007) (hereinafter Fox, The Other Path) T. Stewart, J. Clarke and S. Jokes, Competition Law in
Action: Experience from Developing Countries (international Development Research Center, 2007); M. Gal,
Competition Policy in Small Market Economies (Harvard University Press, 2003); L. Cernat and P. Holmes,
Competition, Competitiveness and Development: Lessons from Developing Countries (UNCTAD 2004).
10
For more details regarding the benefits of transplantation, see Gal, Michal S. and Fox, Eleanor M., "Drafting
competition law for developing jurisdictions: learning from experience" (2014). New York University Law and
Economics Working Papers’ Paper 374, at 8.

6

Some practitioners and scholars argue that there should be a unified competition law “model” for
all states to adopt. Although this might seems to be a thankful effort to standardize the
competition law among the glob especially after the globalization took place where the
convergence became an objective of antitrust law in a globalized world, it is not ideal, as it
seems. As Eleanor Fox criticize“[c]onvergance implies universal standards, or at least universal
norms implemented in common ways. The phrase “universal standards” normally refers to the
standards of United States and Europe, which have become the dominant models for the
world.”11 Accordingly, this argument implies tacitly that any state, including developing ones as
Egypt, should import its competition law from either the US or the EU jurisdiction. In other
words, it publicize that developing countries should resort and transplant either the US or EU
competition law model with no regard to the differences in the market scale, economy structure,
and political sphere as important governing factors that contributes to the unique circumstances
of each state. Discarding the context or internal circumstances of the state will provide a negative
implication for developing countries and will increase their economy problems even more.12
Accordingly, the context matters in drafting competition law for developing countries to
minimize the maldistribution of wealth and poverty.13
In light of the above, mainstream literature correctively differentiates between developing
countries and developed countries with regard to the imposition of the competition policy and
therefore the adopted competition law.14This differentiation implies that the context matter.
However, the developed countries tend to ask that developing countries should apply their
competition law models but they illustrate that there will be some obstacles facing the
competition authority while enforcing the Law due to the developing countries fragile
11

Id., Fox, The Other Path, at 5.
For Instance, see Michal S. Gal, Competition Policy for Small Market Economies; HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS;
(2003); 196; arguing that the different and unique nature of “smallness”, which is characterized by high
concentration, high entry and exit barriers and weak levels of operation, explains the importance that these
developing countries adopt competition legislations that is different from their developed counter peers.
13
Fox, The Other Path, supra note 9 at 10.
14
See, for instance, Eleanor M. Fox, THE OTHER PATH; William Kovacic, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND
COMPETITION IN VIETNAM, 13 Antitrust 57 (1999); see also Willian Kovacic, Designing and Implementing
Competition and Consumer Protection Reforms in Transitional Economics: Perspectives from Mongolia, Nepal,
Ukraine, and Zimbabwe, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1197 (1995). DWIGHT H. PERKINS & MICHAEL ROEMER, REFORMING
ECONOMIC SYSTEMS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, (Dwight H. Perkins & Michael Roemer, Reforming eds., Harvard
Kennedy School 1991); P. COOK, R. FABELLA AND L. CASSEY, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE AND COMPETITION
POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (P. Cook ET AL, Edward Elgar, 2007).
12

7

institutions.15In fact, both EU and U.S. always tend to influence developing states to imitate their
models. This trend is conducted through either introducing incentives or coercing the developing
states by tying the adoption of the developed western competition model with aids, market
access, and the like.16 As M. Dabbah, stated “what has become almost normal practice in the
field: rules, practices and theories that are developed in certain parts of the world – mostly in the
European Union (EU) and the USA – have come to be forced down the throat of countries in
developing parts of the world, often with the aid of international organizations.”17
However, the degree of such practices varies from developing state to another. For instance,
Syria’s accession to the WTO has been tied by fulfilling certain requirements. Among these
requirements, is adopting changes to Syria’s economic laws and introducing a certain
competition law domestically.18 Sudan as well was forced to adopt competition law as part of
economic structural reforms to comply with the rules and standards of International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank.19 While other developing countries where offered incentives in the
shape of accessing the markets of their trade partners, Egypt is among those countries as the EU
conditioned the access of the Egyptian goods to the EU markets with the adoption of the
competition law as stipulated in the Euro-Mediterranean association Agreement.20
However, imposing the developed countries, I mean US and EU, models will inevitably lead to
blind legal transplantation that is most likely does not fit the borrowing country’s characteristics.

15

These problems lead to the “post enactment” argument focusing on the enforcement mechanisms that will be
discussed later in page 13 of this paper.
16
The IMF forced Indonesia to adopt a specific competition legislation as a condition for granting Indonesia the
financial aid it sought. The US and EU trend of coercing developing states to adopt their own litigation with no
regard to their domestic context resulted in severe negative implication on the developing countries economy and
attributed to the increase of the already spread poverty. However, it is worth noting that the coercion exercised for
competition law transplantation is much lower than other laws like the IP. For more details on the coercion
regarding legal transplantation, see Hassan El-Kassas, Neo Imperialism Project and the Role of International Law.
See also, the Darwin’s nightmare documentary, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IV7Y9FHcdFk; See
Robert Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983); and Violence and the Word, 95 YALE. L. J., 160129 (1986).
17
Maher M. Dabbah, supra note 4, at 3.
18
Maher M. Dabbah,supra note 4, at 290.
19
Id., at 290
20
Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement, EU-Egypt, Apr., 21, 2004, 2004/635/EC; available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2004.304.01.0038.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2004:304:TOC#L_2004304EN.010039
01.
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Legal transplantation has been proofed to produce negative impact for any state that discards its
own context while transplanting and it will end up, in the words of Dina Waked, to be “ink on
paper.”21 Transplantation has been proofed to provide more problems to the public and
jeopardizes the developmental goals of the State.22The developed countries competition model
developed over years and currently is built on the idea of achieving maximum efficiency, while
the developing countries should build their law to achieve developmental goals.23Thus, Egypt as
one of the developing countries should seek to adopt a model that responds to its own context.
An important and essential element in determining the scope or aims of the competition policy
and law within any state should be “context”.
Context is identifying and responding to economic realm, in the broad sense,24 within the State in
question. The extent of protection might and should differ to respond to the political and
economic conditions for the state in question. The political elites set the competition policy
which is construed to be the foundational stone that formulates the characteristics of any adopted
competition legislation. Accordingly, the ruling regime and the surrounding political
determinants willingness to adopt free market and competition law differ from one State to
another. The presence of conflict of interest between the political forces acting within the State
affects the aims of the adopted Competition Law. The economy’s condition and development as
well as the market type are also crucial factors in the equation when formulating the competition
law paradigm. That is the reason in which some of the scholars are concerned with establishing a
differentiation between the developed and developing countries when adopting Competition
legislation in the first place. Therefore, in the realm of competition law model, developing
countries should pay attention for crucial factors while drafting the competition Law and should
not depend on blind and mere transplantation of competition legislation. Some argues that
depending on the US or EU transplantation is an effective solution for developing countries. The
21

Dina Waked, Do Developing Countries Enforce Their Antitrust Laws? A Statistical
Study of Public Antitrust Enforcement in Developing Countries, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2044047
22
For a full analysis regarding the problems of pure legal transplantation that is does not take into account the
country’s conditions, see Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean Francois Richard, Economic Development,
Legality, and the Transplant Effect, 47 EUR. L. REV. 165 (2003).
23
MorBakhoum, ‘A dual language in modern competition law? Efficiency approach versus development approach
and implications for developing countries, 34(3 ) WORLD COMPETITION, 495 (2011).
24
It is worth noting that the context of any state is not limited only to the political and economic sphere, but it also
related to the culture and social sphere. However, this paper will only focus on the political and economic sphere
with all of their components elements to better serve the aims of the paper.

9

argument goes, that the two dominant US and EU laws are contested and developed through
numerous decades and in case of US more than a century.
Accordingly, there is no need to reinvent the wheel.25 Despite that in the small world of
globalization in which convergence is a necessary result, as it accelerates the developmental
process of the involved countries, the competition law, as any other law, should derive from
within the state’s condition not from without it.26 The legislation should respond to the unique
contextual problems that need to be solved within the state.27 As established by Dina Waked,
“[T]ransplantation theories abundantly show that copying-and-pasting laws leads to the
inefficiency of these laws and prove their uselessness”,28 as they do not address the local needs.

B. The Political and Economic Considerations
One of the important factors that should be accounted while drafting and applying competition
law within developing countries is the political and economic sphere within the state in
question.29
In fact, the political and economic sphere contributed directly to the developing countries current
weak economic structure. Most of the developing countries have been marginalizing the concept
of competition and free market due to the state monopolization over the different sectors of the
domestic market.30 However, after their economic policy shifts from state monopoly towards the
25

See Gal Supra note 2 at 1. [Presenting a brief on the argument of not reinventing the wheel and its counter
argument that context matters as it concluded that there is no one model fit for all countries developed and
developing.]
26
Fox, The Other Path, at 11
27
Id., at 11
28
Dina Waked, Do Developing Countries Enforce Their Antitrust Laws? A Statistical
Study of Public Antitrust Enforcement in Developing Countries, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2044047
citing, Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor and Jean-Francois Richard, Economic Development, Legality, and the
transplant effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 168 (2003).
29
As noted earlier, this paper will only focus on the political and economic sphere with all of their components
elements to better serve the aims of the paper.
30
Paul Cook; ‘Competition Policy, Market Power and Collusion in Developing Countries’; (December 2002); 33
Center on Regulation and Competition Working Paper Series, at 13. [Speaking on the erected barriers introduced by
developing countries’ governments regarding accessing or exiting the market]; see also, Paul Cook; ‘Competition
Policy, Market Power and Collusion in Developing Countries’,33 Center on Regulation and Competition Working
Paper Series, at 2 (December 2002). [Illustrating the monopolistic role played by developing countries’ government
over enterprises operating in the market place.]
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liberalization and privatization, the state behavior shifted towards rent seeking behavior and
cronyism.31 Developing countries experienced some sort of a setback regarding economic
performance. This setback is due to the political elite’s tendency to strengthen the political and
economic status of a few families and individuals in key sectors of the economy.32 This is what
we can call the oligarchies dilemma in the developing countries. The oligarch presence in
developing countries resulted in concentrated markets and thus concentration of wealth that
developed countries do not experience33. The transformation from a situation where the state’s
control and central planning, to a situation of a free market economy constitutes a challenge for
the developing countries.34
Furthermore, political liberation within the state plays an important role due to its direct and
appreciable effect on the drafting and interpretation of the law. Thus, it must be considered while
proposing the competition law model for any state. Developing countries enjoys certain political
practices that are not experienced within developing ones. Among these practices, corruption,
cronyism, weak institutions, limited democracy, and state preferred oligarchies.35 Moreover, it is
well established that the legislative process usually takes place by the participation and
agreement of the political elites within the state. The political elite’ status in developing
countries differs than most developed states as in the former, the lack of the political
liberalization, democracy, and public participation in both decision making and legislation
process entitles the political elites high levels of intervention to protect and immunize their
interest.
All of these practices contribute to increase the maldistribution of wealth and thus leads to a
systematic poverty. Therefore, the political and economic sphere of the developing states
represent a cross roads with regards of the model of competition law that should be adopted. As
in fact, the pressing need for adopting a competition law varies due to the surrounding political
and economic sphere. This simply means that while the developed countries requires competition
law model that is concerned with economic efficiency that trusts liberalization and free
31

Dina Waked, supra note 3 at 78.
Maher M. Dabbah, Supra note 4, at 289. Dina Waked, supra note 3 at 78.
33
Cook, supra note 30 at 15. Dina Waked, Supra note 3 at 78. Fox, The other path, at 6.
34
Maher M. Dabbah, supra 4, at 308.
35
Fox, The Other path, at 4
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enterprises; the developing countries, on the other hand, should require a competition law model
that eliminate or at least reduce the anticompetitive practices they enjoy more than most of the
developed countries. Practices such as, opacity, cronyism, political preferred enterprises, and
blockage of markets, and further, responds to the maldistribution of wealth. In light of the said, it
is unlikely to be helpful for developing countries to transplant a competition law from the
developed countries; instead, developing countries should contextualize their competition
legislation to respond to their unique characteristics.
Contextualization of the competition law does not mean that we simply tend to reinvent the
wheel, we should rather take advantage of all the provisions of the developed countries’
legislations that have been challenged and questioned throughout a period of one century and
tailor cut them to suit the context conditions of each developing country separately. In fact, I
mean that, even developing countries competition laws should be modified to correspond to each
state unique context. In other words, there should be some sort of general framework to be likely
adopted in all countries that is the identification of the prohibited practices perceived to harm the
competition. However, the extent of the enforcement and the scope of the interpretation should
vary to respond to the different states’ contexts. For instance, the general framework of any
competition law should condemn the abuse of dominant position; however, the interpretation of
such provision should differ from state to another, which is already noted and applied be the
developed countries. For example, a State with the most prosperous economy and market like the
US defines the dominance of any enterprise if it acquires the share of two thirds of the relevant
market place while the EU requires the acquisition of 40 to 50 percent of the relevant market for
undertakings to be classified as dominant. The different percentage of market shares for
determining a dominant position is responding to the different market structure between the US
and the EU. This implies that even the biggest two markets in the world, who usually offer their
competition law model for the developing countries as the “model” to be adopted, contextualize
their own competition law paradigm according to their marker structure. Therefore, the argument
of the sole “model” that should be transplanted is considered a myth and in practice each
country, whether developed or developing, should draft its law with the aim to respond to its
unique characteristics the “context”.
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Despite the established above fact, there have been several arguments led by mainstream
competition law scholars that the problem of enforcement in the developing countries in general
lies solely in the technical and reality constrains the “enforcement mechanism” argument and not
to the adopted model.
C. Enforcement Mechanisms Problem
The general analysis on the literature suggests that the developing countries, usually, face some
obstacles regarding the enforcement of the competition law. Some experts state that the major
obstacle, in Egypt and developing countries in general, lays in the weak institutional
infrastructure they have.36 Despite the fact that I find this allegation plausible, I find it hard to
accept the general diagnoses for any problem as it might defer from one state to another due to
several unique characteristics that each state enjoys. Such characteristics that differentiate one
State from another State. For instance, the culture diversity is one of these characteristics. In
addition, the literacy level, which affects the application of a sophisticated legislation like the
Antitrust Law differs from one developing country to another.
Within this mainstream perception of the obstacles faced by the developing States, some scholars
see the problem is due to the low staffing when compared to population and low budgeting.37
Others think that the problem is the lack of expertise, which developing countries have regarding
the Competition Law and competition policy.38 Accordingly, this raises the question whether the
lack of enforcement problem occurred because of the obstacles mentioned above or it is due to
the law itself.
Personally, I believe that all of these obstacles have contributed negatively to the enforcement of
the developing countries competition laws, but they can only be accepted and perceived as
potential determinative elements of the enforcement problems. However, this is a latter effect on
36

Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public Enforcement of Securities laws: Resource-based Evidence, 93 J. FIN.
ECON. 207 (2009); see Ahmed Farouk Ghoniem, ERF Working Papers (working paper 0239). See also, Alvarez AM
et al. Chapter 3: Anti-competitive practices and the attainment of the millennium development goals: Implications
for competition law enforcement and inter-agency co-operation, (published as part of United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development: Trade and Competition Issues: Experiences at regional level, Geneva and New York, 2007)
at 93. Cited in Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs, Competition Law in The Developing World: A Fish out of water?, Fifth
Annual Competition Law, Economics and Policy Conference October (2011)
37
See Dina Waked, Supra note 2 at 10-11. “[t]he average of the staff is blow 1 per million of population” in Egypt,
which is too low and below the average of the strong enforcement authority.”
38
Fox, The Other Path, at 18; See also, Edward Nathan supra note 5, at 6.
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the weak enforcement as it assumes that the adopted law model provides all support to the
authority enforcing the law in addition to the presence of the well-known practices of evidence
rule. While in fact, the adopted model, in some cases, can omit important best practices and
simultaneously deprives the competition authority from the independence required for achieving
an effective enforcement. In such case, the enforcement mechanisms cannot be perceived as the
main problem of the weak enforcement. The main problem in some cases starts from the wording
of the adopted law model. The Egyptian adopted competition law is a good example regarding
the effect of the law wording over its enforcement despite the presence of the enforcement
mechanisms problems. Therefore, we have to analyze the Egyptian adopted model of
competition law in depth before deciding whether these obstacles are the “fundamental” causes
for the problem or they are one of the “collateral” causes of the problem.39 It is untrue to assume
that the problem, in Egypt lies in the weak institutions, lack of expertise, low budgeting and
staffing compared to the population40 alone, without contesting the wording of the law to
illustrate how it is isolating itself by deviating from the global competition law best practices
with regard to the evidence of agreements in cartel cases and minimizing the independence of the
competition authority. Such examination is important to assess whether the Egyptian model is
contextualized to better serve the public interest and achieve developmental targets or otherwise.

I believe and agree that most of the developing countries lack the expertise, the strong institutional support funding,
and the technological infrastructure. For instance, the official web page of the Egyptian parliament is not working since
the dismantle of the pre-revolution parliament. This is just one example of the weak institutions Egypt has, but in
general, this paper will prove that the “fundamental” cause of the problem lies on the adopted law model which is
signing outside the global competition flock due to the presence and the influence of the political determinants in the
adoption phase.
40 Supra note 5.
39
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III.

Egyptian Competition Law: Deviating from Best Practices Approach

Egyptian competition Law can be seen to be isolating itself from the competition law best
practices when it comes to the competition law sphere. It is of high essence to analyze the
wording of the law to understand how did the Egyptian Law omitted important concepts that
have been acknowledged by most nations who adopted the law before Egypt did. I do not mean
that Egypt should have followed a transplantation approach regarding its competition law
provisions; I rather mean that Egypt should have benefited from the developed experiences of
other nations that have adjudicated the law for a long period of time and in one case like the US a
century ago to contextualize its own model. Such experiences formed a best practice approach in
the realm of competition law. This chapter, through an analytical comparative study with EU and
US law, will establish that the Egyptian law seems to be following a contextualization approach
with regard to its adopted law. However, it was not contextualized to the best interest of the
competition or the public.
A. Multilateral Agreements

The Competition law in general prohibits multilateral conducts that restraints the trade. The vast
majority, if not all, of regimes acknowledges that it is almost impossible to prove such conducts
as it is prohibited by law, which force the parties of such prohibited conducts to avoid entering in
explicit agreements. In fact, “[p]eople of the same trade seldom meet together, even for
merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some
contrivance to raise prices.”41 Therefore, the scope of provisions should not as a matter of policy
be narrowed to the explicit mutual agreement of parties that are well known to be either in
written or oral forms. For instance, law in most countries prohibits drug distribution, let us now
assume that two or more parties want to infringe the law and reach an agreement to distribute
drugs, they are unlikely to enter into a written agreement or even an oral published agreement as
such agreement is illegal. Thus, they are likely to conspire by agreeing in hidden agreement. The

41

ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776). Adam Smith has constructed the economic dimension of the
Industrial Revolution and contributed also for the shifting of economics into the identity of the most required social
science.
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same can be applied to competition law, which usually prohibits multilateral agreements that are
(a) fixing prices, (b) restricting output, (c) dividing markets, (d) organizing boycotts, (e)
organizing bid rigging,42 or in the general sense restricts43 or distorts44 the competition within the
relevant market. The question now is how such agreements can be proofed and on whom lies the
burden of proof regarding such agreements. Is the wording of the Egyptian Law introduce
difficulties on the rule of evidence, if so, does such difficulties are present on the US and EU
Competition Laws. In order to address these questions, we must analyze the wording of the Law
in the three jurisdictions to establish that the Egyptian wording is in isolation of the global
recognized evidence rule best practice approach.
1. Prohibited Multilateral Agreements under US Competition law

It is worth noting that the US introduced competition provisions for the first time ever by virtue
of its Sherman Act in 1890.45 Since this time, a coherent body of different acts have been
introducing provisions that are compatible with the Sherman Act with regard to enhance and
promote the competition within the US market.46
The Sherman Act introduces two major pillars, on which the US competition law enforcement
was first initiated and developed over the years. Those two pillars are 1) the multilateral
anticompetitive behaviors and 2) the unilateral conduct and monopolization.47 However, for the
best interest of this comparison, the focus will be only on the multilateral anticompetitive
behaviors.
42

For instance, see Sherman Act 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890); see also, article 1 of the TFEU (providing a non-exhaustive
list, see article 6 of Law No. 3 of 2005 the Law on Protection of Monopolistic Conducts.
43
The US Sherman Act uses the term “restraint of trade”.
44
The EU competition law in article 101 of the TFEU uses the terms “restriction or distortion of competition”
45
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
46
In 1894, the Wilson Tariff Act was introduces. In 1914, the Clayton Act, which covers under section 7 and 7A,
the tools of controlling mergers in the US competition law regime. In 1914, also, the Federal Trade Commission Act
was adopted, prohibiting unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive conducts or practices affecting trade.
It can be said, that this framework is prohibiting conducts that were already prohibited under the Sherman and
Clayton Acts, but the added value can be construed from the wide provided explanation for the term “unfair” which
has been used extensively by US courts. Since the Federal Trade Commission Act, a body of Acts has been
introduced starting from the 1930 Tariff Act throughout the last adopted Act in 2004 “Antitrust Criminal Penalty
Enhancement and Reform Act. However, the Sherman Act provisions are the ones that have jurisdiction over most
or all the antitrust cases in US and thus, the paper will focus on the Sherman Act in the comparative study.
47
Almost all competition laws all over the glob focuses on those two pillars and either add merger control pillar
within the competition legislation or cover merger control by virtue of a specific legislation.
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Under section 1 of the Sherman Act “([e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”
It is also worth noting that the Sherman Act did not provide a different provision to the vertical
agreements other than the provisions provided under section 1 . In other word, section 1 of the
Sherman Act covers all multilateral anticompetitive conducts and agreements including both
vertical and horizontal agreements and conducts. The word “every”, under the Sherman Act, is
widely construed to cover all agreements that are in restraint of trade. Such agreements are
declared to be illegal ipso facto. The term “conspiracy” widens the scope even more. The
statute’s recognition to the conspiracy approach block the attempts of the competing rivals to
conspire instead of concluding an agreement to avoid being subject for infringing the law.
Explicit agreements that are restraining competition are clearly covered under the Sherman Act.
Due to this fact, it is hard to find explicit evidence of the illegal agreement; as it will never be in
a simple written form. Therefore, the conspiracy agreement can be inferred from the parallel
conduct that would be unprofitable if other firms did not follow the same conduct. This parallel
conduct might be a result of either,1) because the firms are in an oligopolistic market in which
they recognize their price interdependence or, 2) they have engaged in a hidden agreement. In
both scenarios, this act is illegal. The US case law introduced the recognition of the concerted
practices to the prohibited conducts under section 1. In the American Tobacco v .United States,
the court convicted each of the conspired firms and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed each
conviction and provided the following:
In this case, the jury found the petitioner [the three condemned firms] conspired to
fix prices … in the distribution and sale of their principale products. The
petitioners sold and distribute their products to jobbers and to elective dealers who
bought at list prices, less discounts … the list process and the discounts allowed by
petitioners have been practically identical since 1923 and absolutely since 1928.
Since the latter date, only seven changes have been made by the three companies
and those have been identical in amount. The increases were first announced by
Reynolds. American and Liggett thereupon increased their list prices in identical
amounts….On June 23, 1931, the Reynolds, without previous notification or
warning raised the list price …the same day, American increased the list price…
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and Liggett [raised] the price for… to the identical price... No economic
justification for this raise was demonstrated”48

The Court further added:
[i]t is not the form of the combination or the particular means used but the result
to be achieved that the statute condemns. It is not of importance whether the
means used to accomplish the unlawful objective are in themselves wholly
innocent acts. Acts done to give effect to the conspiracy may be in themselves
wholly innocent acts. Yet, if they are part of the sum of the acts which are relied
upon to effectuate the conspiracy which the statute forbids, they come within its
prohibition. No formal agreement is necessary to constitute an unlawful
conspiracy … the essential combination or conspiracy in violation of the
Sherman Act in a course of dealings or other circumstances as well as in any
exchange of words. Where the circumstances are such to warrant a jury finding
that the conspirators had a unity of purpose or a common design and
understanding, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful arrangement, the
conclusion that a conspiracy is established is justified.”49

It is well established that the Sherman Act interpretation does not require the presence of a
formal agreement in the ordinary written form as in fact it widens the prohibition of harmful
conducts to a conspiracy and concerted practices as well. Such practices can be inferred from
unified purpose or through a meeting of minds.
It is worth noting that the US courts when applying the provisions of section 1 wording in
practice depend on two different approaches, the per se and the rule of reason. The former means
that the court does not need to examine whether the conduct in question unreasonably restraints
trade or harms the consumers and competition. The presence of the agreement, conspiracy, or
concerted practice to conclude an anticompetitive profit is enough to conclude a verdict against
the parties of such conduct. The most obvious agreements are: a) price fixing;50 b) output
restriction;51 c); market division;52 d) bid rigging and/or bid rotation; 53 e) concerted horizontal
48

American Tobacco v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946). Mr. Justice Burton delivered the opinion of the Court.
Id.
50
See American Tobacco v. United Stated, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); See Ind. Fed’n. Of Dentists, 476 US 459 (1986);
See also Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2712-13 (2007).
51
United States V. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 US 596, 607-08 (1973); See also, Broad Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 US 1,
19-20 (1979).
52
See Palmar v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 US 46, 49-50 (1990). The court has held that “agreements between
competitors to not compete in other’s territories are per se illegal”.
49
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refusal to supply and boycotts.54 The rule of reason means that the court should consider on case
by case basis whether the agreement in question has a plausible procompetitive justification or
not. If it has, then the court should weight the anticompetitive harm vs. the procompetitive
justification. While the rule of reason approach seems to be applied in all cases where the per se
approach is not applicable. Vertical price restraints should fall under the scope of rule of reason
after the historical US Supreme Court overrule in the 2007 Leegin Creative Product55, which
changed the long standing per se approach domination over the vertical price restraints.
The wording of the US Sherman Act provides the required protection to the competition process
and the consumer welfare as well by widening the scope above the formal agreements to include
concepts like the concerted practice and conspiracy
2. Prohibited Multilateral Agreements EU Competition Law

The EU Article 101 of the TEFU56 is also widening the scope of the illegal conducts to include
“concerted practices and “agreements”. The law provides in the first paragraph of article 101
that:
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: all
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings
and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the internal market, and in particular those which.

This wording facilitates the mission of the commission to establish the presence of the illegal
conduct that might take the shape of concerted practice or tacit collusion among the rivals in the
market. This article grants the commission the authority to challenge vertical agreements,
conditioned that there is no dominance of any of the parties in question within the relevant
market. If there is a dominant position, then the commission can proceed with the vertical

53

See United States v. Wf Brinkley & Son Construction Company Inc., F. 783 F.2d 1157 54 USLW 2508, 1986-`
Trade Cases 66-963 (1986).
54
See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 US 127, 145-46 (1966)
55
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2712-13 (2007).
56
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2008] OJ C115/47, art 101
(“TFEU”)
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restraints case but only under article 102 which regulates the abuse of a dominant position. In
addition, one of the distinguished features that the provision of article 101 provide is the nonexhaustive list of the hardcore restrictions, which is dealt with as illegal by object. In this sense,
it is the exact match of the US per se rule. The only difference is that the US developed the
different approaches through judicial interpretations while the wording of the EU treaty
addressed those concerns explicitly.
Additional different factor, between US and EU, is that article 101 (3) provided the conditions
that might enable an exception for the illegal agreement to evade from being illegal under article
101 (1).57 The exception conditions are, in fact, almost identical to the rule of reason approach
adopted by the US courts. The conditions stipulated in article 101 (3) requires: a) that the
agreement, decision, or concerted practice must contribute to the production or distribution of
goods or contribute to the economic advancement or to promote technical progress, and; b)
granting the consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit.58 Any of these conditions alone
cannot fulfill the requirements of article 101 (3) as the agreement may not impose an inevitable
restriction in order to attain its objectives and should not eliminate even a substantial part of the
product in question.59 In this sense, it appears that exceptions granted under article 101 (3)
requires a rule of reason as required in some cases in the US courts. This means that the EU
sometimes adopt the so-called restriction by object, equivalent to per se illegal of US, while in
other cases deal with the infringements under the analysis of procompetitive effects vs.
anticompetitive effects within the provisions of article 101 (3). This analysis is, by its turn,
equivalent to the rule of reason requirement to outweigh the procompetitive effects vs
anticompetitive effects.

57

Article 101 (3) of the TFEU: “The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case
of:
- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings,
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings,
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices,
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic
progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these
objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the
products in question.
58
See Article 101 (3) of the TFEU.
59
See TFEU Article 101 (3) (a) and (b).
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To establish that an agreement falls under the scope of the prohibited agreements or behavior of
Article 101 (1), the following shall be found:
i) an agreement or concerted practice between two or more undertakings, or a decision by an
association of undertakings must be present; ii) which has as its object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition; iii) this agreement or concerted practice must have an
appreciable effect on competition; iv) an appreciable effect on trade between Member States.
Thus, it is crystal clear the EU adopts the US “Rule of Reason” approach regarding the
anticompetitive agreements after all.
The non-exhaustive list under article 101 (1) provides the agreements which are perceived to be
illegal by object. The word “object does not mean the subjective intention of the parties; instead
it refers to the objective meaning and target of the agreement.60 The commission guidelines on
the application of article 101 (3) stipulates that “… In the case of horizontal agreements
restrictions of competition by object includes price fixing, output limitation and sharing of
markets and consumers…”61
This was firstly construed in the Consten Case in 1966 when the European Court of Justice stated
“… there is no need to take account of the concrete effects of agreements once it appears that it
has as its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of the competition.”62
The European Court of Justice, in Imperial Chemical Industry case has established that the
parties conduct constitutes a concerted practice that is prohibited by Article 101 of TFEU. The
court defined the concerted practices as:
[a] concerted practice does not have all the elements of a contract but may inter
alia arise out of coordination which becomes apparent from the behavior of the
participants. Although parallel behavior may not by itself be identified with a
concerted practice, it may however amount to strong evidence of such a practice
if it leads to conditions of competition which do not correspond to the normal
conditions of the market, having regard to the nature of product, the size and
number of the undertakings, and the volume of the said market. This is
especially in the case if the parallel conduct is such as to enable those concerned
to attempt to stabilize the prices at level different from that to which
60

See Case T 213/00, CMA CGM-FETTCSA, [2003 ] E.C.R., p.II-914 at 183.
See Article 4 and 5 of the Commission Regulation No. 1218/2010, O. J. L 335/43 and 1217/2010, O. J. L 335/36
respectively for more information regarding the application of Article 101 (3).
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competition would have led, and to consolidate established positions to the
detriment of effective freedom of movement of the products in the common
market and freedom of consumers to choose their suppliers.”

The court added that:
[a]lthough every producer is free to change his prices, taking into account in so
doing the present or foreseeable conduct of his competitors, nevertheless it is
contrary to the rules on competition contained in the Treaty for a producer to
cooperate with his competitors, in any way whatsoever, in order to determine a
coordinated course of action relating to a price increase and to ensure its success
by prior elimination of all uncertainty as to each other’s conduct regarding the
essential elements of that action, such as the amount, subject matter, date and
place of the increase.63

In this sense, the EU courts interpretation of the “concerted practices matches the US courts’
interpretations of the “conspiracy” term in the statute and to the judicial introduced “concerted
practices” concept.
3. Prohibited Multilateral Agreements under the Egyptian Competition Law

The Egyptian Competition Law was implemented more than a century after the US Sherman Act
and more than half a century from the EU.64 Despite the tardiness in the introduction of a
competition law paradigm, the Egyptian Law did not benefit from the long interpretations of
either the US and EU jurisdiction. The Egyptian Law deviated from the mainstream of the
evidence rule within the most powerful US and EU regimes, which constitute the role model of
competition law in the world. This deviation is not problematic in itself, but it is problematic due
to its content. No doubt, that contextualizing any law for the unique characteristics of the state is
beneficial and, in fact, should be encouraged. However, the Egyptian Law seems to isolate itself
from all of its peers. The Egyptian Law can be characterized by its unique adopted rule of
evidence regarding the multilateral prohibited agreements. To better understand the nature of the
Egyptian Law, it is worth noting that it constitutes of two interrelated laws. The first is Law No.
63
64

Case 48/69, Imperial Chemical Indus. V. commission, [1972] E.C.R. 619.
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3 of 2005 Promulgating the Law on the Protection of Competition and the Prohibition of
Monopolistic Practices (hereinafter referred to as “Egyptian Law”). The second is the Prime
Ministerial Decree No. 1316 of 2005 issuing the executive regulations of Protection of
Competition and Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices law No. 3 of 2005 (hereinafter referred to
as “executive regulation”). The Executive regulation is an illustrative text to the law and it
cannot add any new provisions to the law wording.
Egyptian Law in article 6 defined the horizontal prohibited agreements in the following way:
Agreements or contracts between competing Persons in any relevant market are
prohibited if they are intended to cause any of the following:
a) Increasing, decreasing or fixing prices of sale or purchase of products subject
matter of dealings.
b) Dividing product markets or allocating them on grounds of geographic areas,
distribution centers, type of customers, goods, seasons or time periods.
c) Coordinating with regard to proceeding or refraining from participating in
tenders, auctions, negotiations and other calls for procurement.
d) Restricting the production, distribution or marketing operations, or limiting
the distribution of services in terms of its kind or volume or applying
restrictions or conditions for their availability.65

It is revealed from the wording of the Egyptian law that the provision is narrowed only to the
“agreements or contracts” and that such agreements or contracts are prohibited if they are
“intended” to cause “any of the following”. This wording significantly narrows the prohibition
of the anticompetitive behaviors to: i) “agreement or contract”, and ii) to the subjects listed in
the exhaustive list. While the term “intended” to cause widen the scope of enforcement to the
subject of the agreement or contract without necessarily requiring that the agreement or contract
succeed to reach its cause or object. In this sense, it can be perceived as following the US and
EU per se approach regarding the enforcement of the horizontal agreements provisions.
However, an important difference is that the US Sherman Act did not provide an exhaustive list
of certain types of agreements that are illegally per se, it instead developed such objects through
case law. While the EU only provided an un-exhaustive list for the hardcore agreements that are
per se illegal by their object. The Egyptian Law did provide an exhaustive list of agreements or
65

Article 6 of Law No. 3 of 2005 Promulgating the Law on the Protection of Competition and the Prohibition of
Monopolistic Practices.
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contracts concerning the so-called hardcore agreements that should be per se illegal and by
doing this; it omitted the possibility to condemn any other horizontal agreements that can harm
the competition even under a much lenient approach such as the rule of reason.
The question that is still vague in the Egyptian Law concerns the definition of agreement or
contract under article 6. Therefore, we should seek the executive regulation in an attempt to
understand what is meant by the terms “agreement or contract” does this covers the concerted
practices, conspiracy, or tacit collusions like the US and EU regimes or not.
The executive regulation in Article 10 provided that “the agreements and contracts concluded
between the competing persons in the relevant market include written and oral agreements and
contracts.”66
This wording reveals the ambiguity and affirms that the “agreements or contracts” that are
prohibited under Article 6 of the Egyptian law should be only limited to “oral and written”
forms. The narrowness of the wording resulted in the omission of any other forms of
agreements stipulated in both the US competition law and EU competition law, which
adjudicated numerous cases upon forms of anticompetitive practices such as the concerted
practice, conspiracy, and tacit collusion.
Contrary to the U.S. and EU law, this wording creates a high burden of proof on the Egyptian
Competition Authority to establish the presence of an agreement within the wordings of the
Egyptian Law text.
The Egyptian Law continues to provide unique provisions that deviate from the worldwide
notions. The following part will tackle the apparatus of the competition law in the three
different regimes to establish that the wording problem of the Egyptian law paradigm is
reflected in different provisions not only the rule burden of proof.

66

Article 10 of the Egyptian Executive Regulation, Prime Minister Decree No.1316 of 2005.
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B. Institutional Apparatus

In this part, we will focus on analyzing the Competition law’s institutional apparatus within
Egypt, US and EU jurisdictions.
1. United States Competition Law Paradigm

i.

The US legislative branch

As stated above, the US competition law is formed basically on the 1890 Sherman Act.67 The
US competition law as one of the legal systems in the US is made up on two different
components. The first component is the federal and the other is the local state component. For
the best interest of this paper, the main focus will remain for the US federal legal system. The
federal system consists of three different but interrelated branches, the legislative branch, the
executive branch, and the judicial branch. When it comes to the competition law in US, it is
worth noting that the judicial branch, the Congress founded the US competition law paradigm
by enacting the 1890 Sherman Act.68

ii.

The US competition competent authorities

One of the most distinguished characteristics of the US competition law paradigm is its dual
enforcement at the federal level with the competence of two different authorities.69 The first
authority is the Department of Justice in particular its Antitrust Division “Antitrust Division”.
While the other competition law competent authority in the US is the Federal Trade

67

Although there is other, Acts concerned with the regulations of the Competition arena including the 1914 Clayton
Act, and the 1914 Federal Trade Commission Act.
68
It is worth noting that the roots of the US legal System dive back the 1788 US ratified Constitution which
established the federal government system and the individual state governments.
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The dual authority involvement when it comes to competition law enforcement is one of the unique characteristics
of the US Competition law regime that distinguish it from other competition law regimes around world.
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Commission “FTC”.70 The duties and roles of both authorities interrelate and overlap to some
extent creating complexities over the years.71
One of the distinguished features between the two authorities is that the Antitrust Division is
part of the Department of Justice and therefore part of the federal government executive branch,
while the FTC is an independent body established by virtue to the 1914 Federal Trade
Commission Act and it reports directly to the Congress. The Antitrust Division is headed by the
Assistant General Attorney for Antitrust with competence on both criminal and civil
enforcement mainly under the 1890 Sherman Act and the 1914 Clayton Act. The FTC main
work arises from the notified mergers reviewed under the Clayton Act.
The most important difference between both authorities is the exclusive competence granted to
the Antitrust Division over the Sherman Act Criminal enforcement, which is also a top priority
to the Division’s agenda; this trend can be perceived from its numerous fierce fights against
cartels.72 The Antitrust Division is granted the required tools to detect and prosecute criminal
cases. Such tools include, the collaboration granted with various investigation authorities and
public bodies including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) who may conduct a variety of
operations that supports the Division’s investigations. Such operations may include gathering
the required incriminating evidence using the FBI undercover operations. The Division, when
proceeding with a criminal case before the federal court, must carry out its role as prosecutor to
establish in court the facts and infringements of the competition law. The Antitrust Division has
the discretion to choose between proceeding with a certain situation either with civil or criminal
cases. The anticompetitive conducted behavior plays a central role in this assessment as if the
infringement is not significant the Division is most likely to proceed with civil case instead of
criminal case and vise-versa.
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The work of FTC is not limited only on the antitrust arena as it also has a bureau of Consumer Protection likewise
a bureau of Economics that provides the necessary support to the bureau of Competition.
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It is worth noting that this subject was among the institutional structure review of the US law paradigm launched
in 2004 by the established Antitrust Modernization Commission (AMC).
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See speech of Scott Hammond, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust: “Recent Developments, Trends,
and Milestones in the Antitrust Division’s Criminal Enforcement Program”, speech delivered in the 56th Annual
Spring Meeting of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law (October 2008, Washington), available
at: www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/232716.htm.
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Both authorities are authorized to investigate and bring enforcement actions for competition law
infringement through civil litigation in federal courts.73 Discretion is also a common feature
between the two authorities when it relates to proceeding with the civil cases (and criminal only
for the Division) or not based on whether they are convinced that an infringement took place or
not. In other words, there is no obligation on the authorities to proceed with all received
complaints and initiate cases unless the authorities are convinced that such complaint represents
an infringement of the competition law.
A notable difference between the two authorities is that the Antitrust Division can only proceed
with civil or criminal cases, while the FTC can issue administrative decisions directly. All FTC
decisions are subject to review by the courts of appeals under the deferential standard of review
accorded to administrative agencies. This is of a huge importance as will appear later on.

iii.

Burden of proof under the US competition law paradigm

As illustrated above, the US has two competition authorities. One of them is part of the
executive branch, which is the Antitrust Division. While the other, the FTC, is an administrative
agency. The former is granted all the exclusive competence over the criminal cases with a
common competence on civil cases with the FTC. In addition, the Division must seek federal
courts to extract a decision whether criminal or civil. Thus, the burden of proof regarding the
evidence of an anticompetitive situation lays on the Antitrust Division.
On the other hand, the FTC, as an administrative agency, has the right to issue an administrative
decision(s) against any enterprise whenever it established the presence of an infringement of the
competition law. Hence, such decision(s) are subject to judicial review by the courts of appeals.
In such case, the FTC must defend its decision.
One unique feature of the US competition law paradigm that it provides treble damages by
private suits according to US Code “[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or
73

See Article 5 of the FTC Act. As established before the criminal infringement exclusive competence is granted to
the Antitrust Division.
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property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district
court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an
agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by
him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fees.”74
This wording granting individuals the right to file a claim directly before courts to seek treble
damages from the court for any injuries imposed to its business as an effect to antitrust
infringement. In such case, the burden of proof lays on the plaintiff.
Accordingly, the burden of proof under the US competition law does not always lay on only one
party, instead, it is either on the Antitrust Division or on the individuals who seek private
enforcement to compensate the damages they incurred from the infringements of the antitrust
law. The private enforcement may be achieved through: i) damages claim,75 ii) injunctions,76 iii)
class actions, 77 and iv) limitation period.
The reliance on private actions under the US antitrust law regime can be perceived as a positive
instrument that carries a considerable advantages whether in terms of providing individuals who
are injured from antitrust infringement with an avenue to seek compensation or by offering
redress to a wrong specially in cases that the relevant competition authority chooses not to
investigate the infringement.78 In addition, such reliance relieves, in particular, the burden on
the Antitrust Division or the FTC to proof presence of a violation within the meaning of the US
competition law.
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US Code Tittle 15, Commerce and Trade. 15 U.S.C., Article 15; “Antitrust Laws” are defined in 15 U.S.C article
12, to be the Sherman Act and Clayton Acts along with their amendments.
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By virtue of section 4 of the 1914 Clayton Act, private parties who have suffered loss due to a competition law
infringement are granted the right to launch such actions before federal courts. In practice, it I can be called trebledamages claim.
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Injunctions are one of the private enforcement strands under the US Antitrust law paradigm where it is governed
under section 16 of the 1914 Clayton Act to offer equitable remedy for relief.
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The class actions are governed by Article 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures that provides for
certification of class action(s).
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It is worth noting that in cases publicly enforced, despite the effective and huge penalties it might lead, it does not
compensate individuals who suffer injuries resulting from anticompetitive conduct or behavior.
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iv.

The US Judicial Branch

The US courts have played such an important role in the US competition law arena due to two
main reasons. First, the US antitrust regime is judicially enforced accordingly the courts are
granted the required powers to rule on the applicability of competition rules in different
situations and to decide on cases. Second, the language on which the US competition law was
drafted reveals that it used a broad terms with a common law nature which grants the court the
wide discretion in their application of the law.
On the federal level, the district courts are the general competent courts whether on criminal or
civil cases. Above the district courts lays the courts of appeals with 11 numbered circuit courts
operating on jurisdiction based geographically. The highest court in the US competition regime
is the US Supreme Court.

2. The EU Competition Law Paradigm

i.

The EU legislative Branch

The EU Competition institution apparatus differs from the US in several aspects. Such
differences are caused due to the nature of the Union itself, as it is not a country instead, it
consists of different member states that each has its own sovereignty and applicable laws. The
legislation was introduced in 1957 by virtue to the Rome Treaty (Treaty of European
Community)79 The Legislative branch for the union became the European Parliament.

ii.

The EU competition competent authority
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Precisely Article 81 and 82 of the EC treaty regulated the Competition Law. During this time, there was only six
member States. The Treaty of European Union that took place in 1992 replaced this Treaty. The provision regulating
the competition law has been changed to be 101 and 102 instead of articles 81 and 82 respectively.
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Unlike the US, the EU has only one competent authority when it comes to the enforcement of
the competition law within the EU member states. This authority is called the European
Commission (hereinafter the “EU Commission”).
The EU commission has been granted all the required powers and independence to ensure the
best implementation of the competition policy and law within the EU member states. The vast
and various extensive powers granted to the EU commission, by virtue to Regulation 1/2003,
include the respond to claims or start its own. The Commissions have the right to require
answers to complaints, require documents and any other information it deems necessary to
respond in response to investigations. Furthermore, the EU Commission may conduct onsite
inspections whether by virtue of a notice or not. The Commissions officials are granted the right
to enter premises they suspect contains important documents including private homes and cars.
Moreover, the commission, once proved breaches of the EU competition law, has the right to
issue administrative decisions and imposing penalties up to 10 percent of the total worldwide
turnover in the business year preceding the breach. Decisions of the Commissions are deemed
binding and may only be challenged by the General Court of the EU “GCEU” in which the court
has the right to either annul the decision in part or in whole and may increase or decrease the
applied penalties.
In addition, the Commission provides guidance to the European community through guidelines
and notices. However, the EU competition law, as indicated above, does not have criminal
penalties unlike the US Antitrust Law. The EU law differs than the US in an important aspect,
which is the sole competence, provided to the commission, as there is no private enforcement or
treble damages. In addition, the commission enjoys the exclusive right to investigate and decide
upon situations where an infringement of the competition law is suspected. In other words, those
who are harmed by competition law infringement in EU have only one path to take which is
submitting a complaint to the EU commission. They cannot initiate their own case before courts.
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iii.

Burden of Proof under the EU Competition Law paradigm

As indicated above, the EU Commission has the discretion, after investigating the conduct in
question, to either issue an administrative decision or to refrain from proceeding with the
investigation. If the Commission issued an administrative decision, it is considered enforceable.
However, the party that was held liable according to the commission’s decision is granted the
right to challenge the decision in question before the European Courts. In such case, he becomes
the plaintiff and the burden of proof rests on his shoulders as he have to establish before the
court that his conduct or behavior is not construed to make an infringement with accordance to
the EU competition law. However, it is important to note that the General Court of EU in the
case of European Night Services v. Commission80 illustrated that the Commission is obliged to
set out the facts and considerations having relevant importance of its decisions. The Court
added, that despite the Commission is not required to discuss the facts and issues of law and the
consideration which led to issuing the decision in question, it is required by virtue to the Treaty
to clarify to the Court and the concerned enterprises the circumstances on which it applied the
EU competition rules. Hence, when any Commission decision lacks important analytical data
that enables the Court to assess the existence of an appreciable effect, the court might annul the
Commission’s decision. This is exactly what happened in Airtours plc v. Commission,81 the
General Court annulled the Commission’s decision because the Commission did not supply a
sufficient evidence to support its decision.
Those two particular cases indicate that although the Commission might have the right to issue
an administrative decision, it should provide: a) the required analytical data in which it assessed
the appreciable effect of the conduct in question; and b) the evidence supporting its outcome
decision. Therefore, the burden of proof under the EU is on the Commission. In this sense, the
Commission’s decision can be perceived as the equivalent of the US FTC’s decision(s) as both
are subject to judicial review. However, a drastic difference is that the EU commission is
granted, by the ECJ, the opportunity to strengthen its grip on the EU competition law
enforcement.82
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81

31

iv.

EU Judicial Branch

The EU Judicial apparatus composes of the General Courts of the EU (GCEU) that was
established in 1989 to ease the workload of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and to provide
a first instance judicial review to the challenged decisions of the EU Commission. The GCEU
has the right either to confirm the Commission’s decision or to annul it whether partially or in
its entirety.
The ECJ is the highest court in the judicial system and in relation to competition law, it plays
the role of the appellate court. The ECJ also have the right to annul the GCEU judgment
whether partially or entirety; or to confirm the judgment.
3. The Egyptian Competition Law Paradigm
i.

The Egyptian Legislative Branch

The Egyptian competition law institutional apparatus differs drastically from the US and EU
counters in several aspects. Such differences can be perceived from the formation of the
competition law regime itself as detailed below. The Egyptian Parliament approved the Law
No.3 of 2005 promulgating the Law on Protection of Monopolistic Conducts on the 15th of
February 2005.83

ii.

The Egyptian competition law competent authority

The Egyptian Competition Authority (“the ECA”) was formed in 2005 by virtue of the Prime
Minister Decree No. 1316 of 2005 promulgating the Egyptian competition law executive
regulation.84 This regulation stipulates the powers granted to the ECA to execute and fulfill the
duties assigned to it whether by virtue to the Law or the Regulation. The ECA enjoys wideranging powers with regard to the application of the law. Similarly to the EU Commissions and
both US competent authorities, the ECA has the right to receive complaints, conduct
83

Promulgated in the Official Gazette No. 6 (bis) on 15th of February 2005 and entered to force on 15 of the same
month 2005.
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Promulgated in Official Gazette No. 32 (bis) on August 17 of 2005 and entered into force on August 18 of 2005.
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investigations, inspection, collect information and issue administrative decisions85 regarding
illegal anticompetitive conducts. During the investigation process, some of the ECA chosen staff
might have the status of law enforcement officials to enable them to reach documents and reports
of governmental and nongovernmental entities. Article 17 of the Egyptian competition law
stipulates that “The employees of the Authority, who shall be specified by virtue of a decree
issued by the Minister of Justice, in agreement with the Competent Minister and upon the
recommendation of the Board, shall be granted the status of law enforcement officers in applying
the provisions of this Law.”86
It is worth noting that this status is not granted to all the ECA employees due to their capacities,
but it is granted upon; first the recommendation of the board and, second, the agreement of the
competent minister; and third, the decree issued by the Minister of Justice upon his agreement.87
This an important drastic difference that distinguish the ECA granted powers compared to both
the US Antitrust division and the EU Commission staff who are granted the status of law
enforcement officials due to their capacities. It is also worth noting that the Egyptian law does
not impose criminal penalties. In this sense it is different than the US Sherman Act and similar to
the EU competition law.
iii.

Burden of Proof under the Egyptian Competition Law Paradigm

It is essential to illustrate that when it comes to launch the proceeding of the criminal case, the
ECA’s hand are tied. According to Article 21 of the Egyptian Competition Law, the
Criminal lawsuits or any procedure taken therein shall not be initiated in
relation to acts violating the provisions of this Law, unless a request of the
Competent Minister or the person delegated by him is presented. The
Competent Minister or the person delegated by him may settle with regard to
any violation, before a final judgment is rendered, in return for the payment of
an amount not less than double the minimum fine and not exceeding double its
maximum. The settlement shall be considered a waiver of the criminal lawsuit
85

It is worth noting that the administrative decisions issued by the ECA are of a non-binding nature and may not
introduce any sanction. In this sense, it can be perceived as an advisory decision.
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Article 17 of the Egyptian Competition Law No. 3 of 2005. Amended in 2014, but this amendment did not change
the fact that status of law enforcement officers granted to the ECA employees as the same conditions still apply for
granting them this status.
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See also Article 26 (D) of the executive regulation regulating the process of recommending the names of certain
ECA employees who are chosen by the board to have the status of law enforcers’ officials.
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filing request and shall result in the lapse of the criminal lawsuit relevant to the
same case subject of suing. May not be a criminal proceeding or action in
relation to the acts contrary to the provisions of this law unless a written request
from the Prime device management based on the approval of a majority of its
members.88
In light of this wording, the ECA lacks the independence to proceed with the criminal law suit as
this right is exclusively granted to the competent minister or the delegated minister.
In light of the forgoing, even if the ECA succeeded to proof the presence of a prohibited
agreement within the extremely narrow meaning of Article 6 of the Egyptian competition law, it
cannot issue a binding administrative decision applying the sanctions stipulated in the law and
ironically, it cannot either launch the proceeding of the criminal case. In light of the foregoing, it
appears that the ECA suffers from an extreme marginalization for its role within the competition
law regime. Such marginalization detracts the ECA’s independence in an unprecedented way.
The significant narrow wording of the Egyptian evidence rule regarding the horizontal
agreements along with the ECA’s lack of independence confirms that the Egyptian competition
law is placing itself in an isolated island abandoning the global competition law flock.

iv.

The Egyptian Judicial Branch

The Egyptian Competent Court regarding the enforcement of the Competition Law is the
Egyptian Economic Court by virtue of Law No. 120 of 2008 on the Establishment of the
Economic Courts.89
The Economic Courts are mainly composed of two chambers or circuits. The first instance
chambers and chambers of appeal both chambers are granted the jurisdiction of criminal actions
resulting from the crimes provided in the Competition Law. Without prejudice to the cases that
are within the jurisdiction of the State Council, the first instance chambers of the Economic
88

Article 21 of the Egyptian Competition Law N o.3 of 2005. The author is intentionally focusing on this Article
before the 2014 amendment.
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Article 4 (14) of Law No. 120 of 2008 Establishing the Economic Courts of Egypt. Entered into force on October
1st, 2008. During the period from 2005 to October 2008, the general courts of Egypt were the competent courts
according to the geographic jurisdiction.
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Courts have the jurisdiction on disputes whose value does not exceed 5 million Egyptian Pounds
and that result from application of the following laws, while the appeal chambers have the
jurisdiction on case that exceed 5 million Egyptian Pounds. 90Finally, the Court of Cassation is
the highest court on the Egyptian judicial branch.
C. Competition Law Immunity System

The immunity system (also called the leniency program) in the competition law realm means that
whoever report or confess, to the competent competition authority, the presence of
anticompetitive behavior should be entitled to a waiver from the legal liability conditioned that
the submitted information and documents were effective to the authority during the
investigations process. This is construed to be one of the most effective tools granted to the
competition authorities for detecting competition law infringements. However, Egypt again, did
not take into consideration whether the US or the EU developed competition rules regarding this
subject matter and it has established a new leniency program that confirms that it remains in
deviation with the best practices approach.

1. US Leniency Program
The US has adopted the leniency program for the first time in 1978 and substantially revised the
program with the issuance of a Corporate Leniency Policy in 1993 as well as the Leniency Policy
for Individuals issued in 1994.91 Through the Division's leniency program, an enterprise can
avoid criminal liability and imposition of fines, while individuals can avoid criminal liability,
prison sentences, and imposition of fines, conditioned of being the first to confess involvement
participation in a criminal antitrust violation, fully cooperating with the Division, providing
effective information and meeting the six specified requirements under the policy. The same
leniency can be extended to the corporate directors, officers, and employees. The importance of
such policy is the encouragement it presents for enterprises that have been participating in an
anticompetitive conduct or agreement, that infringes the competition law, by providing a waiver
90
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from the legal questioning of such infringement. The six listed requirements for benefiting from
the policy ensures that the whistle blower do not evade the penalties if the process of evidencing
the infringement by the division was almost concluded.

2. EU Leniency Program
The EU started it leniency or immunity program since 1996. In 2002, a new commission notice
was issued to govern the enforcement of such lenience program. Currently, the EU is working on
its last issued commission notice that was issued back in 2006. However, this part will focus only
on the 2002 notice, as it was the effective one when the Egyptian competition law was issued.
According to the 2002 commission notice Article 8,92 there should be two different programs.
The first is full waiving from the sanctions and it is called “immunity from fines”, while the
second is referred to as the “fine reduction program”, where the reporter benefits only from a
reduction in the sanction. The “immunity from fines” reads as follows:
The Commission will grant an undertaking immunity from any fine which would
otherwise have been imposed if: (a) the undertaking is the first to submit evidence
which in the Commission’s view may enable it to adopt a decision to carry out an
investigation in the sense of Article 14(3) of Regulation No 17 in connection with
an alleged cartel affecting the Community; or (b) the undertaking is the first to
submit evidence which in the Commission’s view may enable it to find an
infringement of Article 81 EC in connection with an alleged cartel affecting the
Community.
While the “reduction in fine” program reads as follows: “Undertakings that do not meet the
conditions under section [A] above may be eligible to benefit from a reduction of any fine that
would otherwise have been imposed.”93
It is revealed from this wording that the EU intention was to encourage the cartel participants to
whistle blow this cartel and benefit either from a full “immunity from fines” or “reduction in
fine” in return. The detailed criteria that qualify the reporter to either program will not be
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examined as they fall outside of this paper’s scope. The aim of this part is only to highlight the
differences between the EU and Egypt Immunity Programs under the competition law to
establish concrete analogical evidence that Egypt did not follow the mainstream competition law
and it putting itself in a different isolated place.
3. Egypt’s Leniency Program

Astonishingly, the Egyptian competition law when it was adopted in 2005 did not have any
immunity or leniency policy. This means that while the US started its leniency program back in
1978 and the EU back in 1996, while Egypt’s competition law did not implement such program
in the law when firstly adopted in 2005. It was not until June 2008, that Egypt firstly introduced
its leniency program by virtue of the law No. 193 of 2008.94 By virtue of this addendum, only
one and sole leniency policy was introduced. This policy consists of a 50 percent waiver from
applicable sanctions for only the first reporter.95 Moreover, the relevant court is to assess the
significance of the submitted evidence and shall either grant the reporter with the 50 percent
sanctioning waiver or refrain according to its will and assessment.
In addition, it is worth noting that even when the leniency article was firstly introduced in 2008
after three years of competition law implementation, the leniency was only for 50 % of the
applicable sanctions and fines. The 50 % liability is incompatible with the basic objective behind
adopting a leniency policy in the first place, which is encouraging the infringing parties to seek
redemption without being subject to legal sanctions and fines. Therefore, it appears from the
original text’s wording that Egypt did not even mention the leniency policy and when it adopted
it, it was in a form that drastically and significantly deviated from the global competition law
flock.
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Law No. 193 of 2008 Adding New Article (26) to the Law No, 3 of 2005 Promulgating the Law on the
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37

D. Comments

As can be seen from the above analysis, the Egyptian competition law drastically differs than
the EU and US regarding the enforcement of competition rules in several levels. Firstly, as
indicated above, Egypt has adopted an extreme narrow wording when it comes to proofing the
presence of a horizontal anticompetitive agreement to oral and written agreements only. The
Law omitted from including well-known tacit agreements and collusion practices that are most
likely to take place to evade being illegal agreements within the scope of competition laws.
Adam Smith in his book “Wealth of Nations” stated that [p]eople of the same trade seldom meet
together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the
public, or in some contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings,
by any law which either could be executed, or would be consistent with liberty and justice. But
though the law cannot hinder people of the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it
ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much less to render them necessary.”96
According to wording of the Egyptian competition law and its executive regulation, it is revealed
that the Egyptian Competition Law only recognizes the proof of any illegal agreement or
contract whenever they are either in written or oral forms. This strict and narrow wording ties the
hand of the ECA from proving other forms of anticompetitive behaviors. Such anticompetitive
behaviors can be concluded through “tacit collusion”, “concerted practices”, and “conspiracy”
not only through an “agreement”. In fact, the wording of the Egyptian law omits any reference to
such behaviors and concepts. This omission is problematic as in practice the authority is bound
to work within the powers granted to it by virtue of the law. In such case, the law limits the
ability of the Egyptian Competition Authority to reveal and detect situation of collusion. In fact,
the competition authority should be granted, by virtue of the law’s wording, additional concepts
or tools to prove the existence of anticompetitive behaviors, other than the oral and written. This
narrowness and omission in the wording resulted in making it practically impossible for the
competition authority to prove collusions, concerted practices, and conspiracies. This wording
contributed in increasing the barriers of the already difficult Competition Authority task to
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prevent such behaviors from being concluded as stated by Adam Smith, two centuries ago,
regarding the impossibility of preventing meetings and thus agreements between competitors to
“conspire” on the public to maximize their own welfare. On the other hand, the US seems to
wisely take precautions towards Adam Smith’s warning regarding meetings that conclude in
conspiracy, which can justify the Sherman’s Act wording regarding the prohibition of
anticompetitive agreements that explicitly added the term “conspiracy” to the prohibited
conducts besides the agreements. The EU as well introduced the notion of concerted practices to
cut the road before such collusion and conspiracy.
Second vital and importance difference lays within the identification of the prohibited
agreements and behaviors as stipulated in both US, EU, and Egypt competition rules. While the
Egyptian Competition Law, in Article 6, provides an exhaustive list of agreements to be
prohibited Per Se when it used the term “any of the following”, the EU on the other hand
widened the scope, again, and provided a non-exhaustive list of Agreements. The US did not
provide a list of agreements at all, instead it used general provision wording as it was drafted on
a common law form. Upon judicial implementation, the US courts developed a differentiation
of the hardcore agreements and other agreements. In case of Egypt, the law omits to include
other agreements than the hardcore agreements even if adjudicating such agreements under the
rule of reason approach. Meaning that the ECA should prove the anticompetitive agreement
either in written or oral forms and the agreement’s subject should fall within the provided
exhaustive list.
Third, by virtue of the law’s wording, the ECA lacks the independence and support that enables
any competition authority from fulfilling its obligations. In contrast of the competent
authorities in US and EU, the ECA is characterized by the following: i) it cannot issue a binding
administrative decision even if it is subject to judicial review, ii) not all of the ECA’s employees
and staff enjoys the state of law enforcers in a contrast with the US and EU officials who are
given such status by virtue of their capacities; iii) ECA cannot launch the criminal proceeding
by itself.97
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Finally, the Egyptian law adopted, in a drastic deviation from the global practice, a leniency
program that discourages the infringer(s) from reporting their violation to the applicable
competition rules as they will be liable to 50 % of the applicable fines.98
It is now established that there is a problem within the Egyptian competition law regime and that
the wording of the law is responsible for the Egyptian competition law weak enforcement.
However, the relevant question is why the provisions of the Egyptian competition law were
drafted on such way. If we contested the two mainstream theories, the pre-enactment and the
post-enactment, we cannot find an analogical proof for the Egyptian weak enforcement. While
the Egyptian law is contextualized, it appears from the above analysis that it contextualized its
law in a way that cannot be explained under the pre-enactment theory. It is neither transplanted
nor contextualized to fit its context. In addition, the post-enactment theory, which alleges that the
main reason of weak enforcement in developing countries lies within the weak enforcement
mechanisms and institutions they have, cannot also justify the weak enforcement of the Egyptian
law. To illustrate, let us assume that the EU commission with all of its expertise, funds and
strong technical infrastructure has to work with the wording of the Egyptian competition law and
within the limited independency provided by its wording, it is unlikely to fail in reach an
effective enforcement. Therefore, the post-enactment theory cannot explain the weak
enforcement of the Egyptian competition law.
Accordingly, as both mainstream theories failed to provide explanations of the enforcement
failures, it is most likely because they underestimated the importance of the political
determinants role. Therefore, to better understand the reason(s) behind this wording that places
the Egyptian competition law in an isolated place, we should examine the political determinants
that substantially contributed to the Egyptian law isolation.
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IV.

Why is the Egyptian Competition Law Singing outside the Flock: The Role of
Political Determinants

As established earlier, the Egyptian Law is not a transplanted model as it omitted important
concepts of western competition laws, such as the concerted practices, tacit collusion, and
conspiracy between the competing undertakings. In addition, the law deprived the ECA from the
required independency to fulfil its tasks. The introduced partial immunity system discourages
potential whistle blowers to approach the ECA, which adds more difficulties on the enforcement
level. Due to all of these differences between the Egyptian Law and EU and US legislations, it is
clear that no transplantation took place. Therefore, the logical analogy is that Egypt’s
competition model is a contextualized one. To reveal why it is contextualized in such manner,
we have to examine it with the context theory.
As we have seen in chapter I, the context theory advocates that the contextualizing state should
ensure that the economic and political context is taken into consideration during the
contextualization process. Therefore, we should give a brief on the Egyptian economic and
political context before and during the enactment phase. Afterwards, the political determinants
factor will be added to the equation to understand both questions why the ruling regime was
motivated to introduce a competition legislation and why it has intentionally ensured that the law
is destined to wane before it sees the light.
A. Economic and Political Paradigm
Since the 1952 Military coup, the new republic regime started a programmed and organized
expropriation program that transforms the tittles of the lands, factories, buildings, and companies
from private individuals to the republic During this stage, the Egyptian government played a
significant role in the economy that inevitably became without any competition from private
sector. In 1952, the contribution of the private sector was estimated by 76 % of the total
investments.99 During the 1960s, the estimation of private sector contribution dramatically
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decreased by a significant way to constitute only 10 % of the total investments made in Egypt.100
It is highly illustrated that such state monopolization over almost all market sectors made the
idea of adopting competition law was not a plausible idea.
The Egyptian economy is usually defined, since then, as a rentier economy due to its dependence
on the rents of either natural resources or its Suez Canal, Tourism, remittances of Egyptian
workers abroad, and foreign aids.101 By mid of the 1980s, the Egyptian economy experienced a
dramatic depression due to the crash of oil prices in 1985-86 and hence structural reforms
became inevitable.102 Undoubtedly, this fact created an urging need for economic reform as well
as seeking a stabilizing mechanism.103 In an attempt to overcome the mentioned depression,
Egypt adopted an economic reform and structural adjustment in 1991. This program was led by
the International Monetary Fund (hereinafter “IMF”) and with the contribution of the World
Bank. According to the IMF statement in 1991, the program aimed to “create, over the medium
term, a decentralized market based, outward-oriented economy where private sector activity will
be encouraged by a free, competitive, and stable environment with autonomy from government
intervention”104. This program as illustrated from the IMF above statement, paved the road for
the reintroduction of private sector within the Egyptian market on the expense of the public
sector. This means that the Egyptian government should start a systematic privatization program
in which the public state owned enterprises are sold to private investors.
However, such reform program is likely to weaken the ruling regime’s grip over the political
sphere. As Samer Soliman stated “Egypt’s authoritarian regime was heavily dependent on the
state’s financial assets to sustain its monopoly on power. These resources were dwindling, and,
in order to compensate, the regime was forced to turn increasingly to more politically risky
economic policies. Sufyan Alissa adds at this time, “Egyptian political elite recognized the
desirability of reforms but were concerned that these reforms if conceivably taken too far, could
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undermine their own power… [t]he regime was aware that fundamental changes in the structure
of the public sector and…privatization process would threaten its support base.”105
In its attempt to avoid minimizing its own power and monopoly over the state, Mubarak’s ruling
regime, started the transformation of the government driven socialist market to a capitalist free
market. In this era, the state monopolization over the Egyptian market, have simply been
replaced by private monopolization.106 The economic benefits and the accumulated wealth were
systematically allocated for a small minority to acquire its control not only for the mentioned
benefits, but also for the accompanied stable economic growth.107 This small, but powerful
minority, the oligarch, who mostly own large businesses, were the major beneficiaries of the
economy. The oligarch acquired their economic control, and wealth through systematic
corruption and state favoritism.108 Due to the oligarch monopolization over the Egyptian
economy, it became of a concentrated nature. One of the characteristics of the Egyptian market is
the oligarch who runs different sectors of the economy. The lack of political liberation under the
ousted Mubarak regime resulted in the monopoly of the political arena as well. During this era,
Mubarak used to adopt systematic appointments for the highest positions in the state, whether in
legislative or executive authority, which focused only on the loyalty to the regime while
discarding the expertise and qualifications from the appointments ‘criteria. This is a cronyism
and nepotism approaches in governmental political appointments.
Soliman stated that with the:
[g]rowing power and influence of the capitalist class, it becomes easier to
understand why more and more prominent businessmen have been occupying
key political positions. The distribution of political positions in Egypt obeys a
precise equation that reflects the relative weight of various groups in the regime.
If army officers obtain a percentage of top posts (governorships, for example),
this mirrors the weight of the armed forces. That businessmen are garnering a
share of top posts reflects the regime’s acknowledgement of the growing weight
of this community for the first time since the inception of the 1952 order.
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Moreover, the process picked up… in the … 2004 … government brought on
board three businessmen as ministers of industry, transportation, and tourism.109
On the political level, it is more likely that the minority of oligarch/businessmen will aside with
the ruling regime’s politics if it is threatened that political liberation might bring political forces
that might harass its interests.110 Simultaneously, the ruling regime will tend to contain the
oligarch to exploit its growing economic and human resources to stabilize its throne. This can be
illustrated from the 2000 and 2005 Parliament, as stated by Soliman, “[P]eople’s Assembly
elections in 2000 and 2005 indicate that when electoral fraud is curtailed, businessmen’s
parliamentary fortunes improve. It follows that, since Egyptian capitalism is already present in
the assembly and is capable of increasing its share of seats, it would have little problem with a
reduction in the powers of the executive and the establishment of a strong parliamentary order.
The electoral experiences have shown that a candidate’s best guarantee for securing a
parliamentary seat resides in his ability to provide services for his constituents. This ability
derives either from his money or his government connection.”111 During this time, most of the
oligarch/businessmen joined the National Democratic Party “NDP”, Mubarak’s party that is
headed by his son Gamal.

The internal political forces have changed and a redistribution of power took place. The
oligarchs succeeded to force them self in the equation as one of the centers of power. As
described by Soliman, “the patrons are no longer the bureaucratic and military elites;
businessmen are now swelling their ranks.”112 Mubarak’s regime before adopting competition
law, rested on an alliance concluded between the ruling regime, the NDP, and oligarch.113
Soliman described this change on the political level by stating:
[t]he chief formula for political change is a political marriage between the
state bureaucracy and capitalism under the umbrella of the regime and the
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NDP, in particular. This formula has already obtained the approval of the
sector of the capitalist class that is most closely connected with the regime.114
Several ministers’ cabinets were accompanied with active oligarch/businessmen. Gamal
Mubarek and Ahmed Ezz the well-known Steel monopolist producer ruled the National
Democratic Party “NDP”. The NDP monopolized the parliament (the legislative body in Egypt)
with no competition to be remembered. The NDP exercises and the conflict of interest between
its representatives as legislator and executives in one hand and as businessmen who are still
active within the economic and market arena on the other hand was catastrophic on the economy
development.115 This means that the Egyptian political and market sphere was characterized
during Mubarak’s regime with cronyism, concentrated market, state favoritism, corruption,
maldistribution of wealth, lack of political independence and fair economic participation. It is not
surprising that such ruling regime will even think of adopting a competition law paradigm in
which it can abolish or limit some of the above practices as it will decrease the state preferred
enterprises and this will inevitably create a disorder to the vision of this regime with regard to the
wealth and power distribution. In the words of Maher Dabbah,“[i]n some parts of the world the
idea of having competition is taken to mean a reduction in the power and influence of those few
individuals or families controlling specific sectors of the local economy; it is therefore a highly
undesirable and disliked idea”116 to adopt a competition law domestically. This means that the
ruling regime has been giving an insufficient and inadequate recognition to the value of
competition principle as an essential and foundational stone for the free market economy that
leads to the economy development.117.
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B. The Emergence of Egyptian Competition Law and the Role of Political
Determinants

The logical question that must be answered is why such authoritarian regime even thought of
introducing a competition law in the first place. The answer is very simple; it is because of the
pressures exerted by two different forces (internal and external). The internal pressure is
represented in the Egyptian economic fragile status (ex: high unemployment rates, inflation, etc.)
that resulted, in part, from the highly concentrated market levels. Due to this fragile economic
status, the ruling regime was forced to take further actions to attract foreign direct investments
(FDI). The fact that foreign investors will directly invest and pump huge foreign capitals to the
Egyptian market is unlikely to occur without providing the same level of competition protection
that they are acquainted to in their home countries.
The other force is represented in the external pressures118 used by its international trade partners.
It is well established, that cross borders trade partners highly influences the competition law
scene within developing states.119 Generally, in developing countries, the usual governments
trend is to accommodate western interests, this trend forms the parameters of the competition law
and policy if the developing country took the submission path to such pressures.120 Keeping in
mind that Egypt is depending heavily of financial aids as one of its rentier economy. Ironically,
both factors, domestic high concentrated market levels and external trade partners’ pressures,
contradict with regard to their influence on the competition law model to be chosen by Egypt
In the Egyptian case, the external trade partner was the EU. The Egyptian – EU trade relations
firstly commenced in 1977 by signing the General Cooperation Agreement.121 This Agreement
prevailed until 1996. During its term, a preferential trade relationship was provided.122 Egypt, by
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virtue to this Agreement, was granted a non-reciprocal free market access to the EU market place
for all industrial exports excluding clothing and textiles.123 There was no requirement or
mentioning for the need of competition legislation, not until the 1995 Barcelona Conference
when negotiations of Association Agreements took place that the competition legislation subject
was brought to the light.124 The aim of Barcelona negotiations is to establish a strong and
coherent understanding between the parties to adopt a free trade area (FTA) between the EU in
one hand, and the Mediterranean neighbors in the other hand by no later than 2010.125 The
outcome of the excessive serious of negotiation was the bilateral Euro-Mediterranean
Association Agreement with the EU and each of the Mediterranean neighboring countries.126
The EMAA with Egypt come into effect in July 2004.127 During this time, Egypt did not have
any competition law in place. The EMAA gave Egypt a provisional period of five years to
implement some of its obligations, amongst them was the adoption of competition law
provisions.128 Not only this, but Article 72 of the EMAA stipulated that a “financial cooperation
package shall be made available to Egypt” focused among others on “the accompanying
measures for the establishment and implementation of competition legislation.”129 This article
indicates that Egypt must fulfill certain obligations as a prerequisite condition for receiving a
cooperation package from the EU, its external trade partner. In addition, Article 34 (1) of the
same Agreement stats:
[T]he following are incompatible with the proper functioning of the
Agreement, insofar, as they may affect the trade between the [Union] and
Egypt:
(i) All agreements between undertaking, decisions, by associations of
undertakings and concerted practices between undertakings which have as their
object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of the competition of
competition;
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(ii) Abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position in the territories
of the Community or Egypt as a whole or in a substantial part thereof;
(iii) Any public aid which distorts, or threatens to distort, competition by
favoring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods.130
It is well established from this wording that anticompetitive agreements, even if in the shape of
concerted practices, abusive practices, and public aids that does not have a negative effect on the
trade between the EU and Egypt shall be subject to domestic competition law jurisdiction
according to the place where the anticompetitive conduct has taken place. In light of this, it is
obvious that the EMAA competition prohibition regarding the anticompetitive agreements and
conducts followed the footsteps of the TFEU rules by adopting the rule of reason approach
regarding such agreement and conducts. The EMAA in Article 34 (2) presented important
declarations from both parties. The EU unilaterally makes the first declaration and it reads as
follows:
The [Union] declares that, until the adoption by the Association Council of the
implementing rules on fair competition reffered to in Article 34 paragraph 2, in
the context of the interpretation of Article 34 paragraph 1, it will assess any
practice contrary to that Article on the basis of the criteria resulting from the
rules contained in Articles (101, 102 and 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union).131
The second declaration made under Article 34 (2) was collectively made by both parties and it
reads as follows:
The Parties recognize that Egypt is currently in the process of drafting its own
competition law. This will provide the necessary conditions for agreeing on the
implementation rules referred to in Article 34 (2). While drafting the law, Egypt
will take into account the competition rules developed within the European
Union.132
This declaration explicitly requires Egypt to consider the EU competition rules while drafting
the Egyptian competition law model for the aim of convergence between the trade partners. This
is an open invitation for transplantation of the EU competition law norms in the general sense, or
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that Egypt’s competition law must be at least influenced by or converged to the EU competition
law rules. By contesting the wording of Article 34 (1) of the EMAA with Egypt, it is easy to see
the transplantation of the EU competition law, precisely Articles 101, 102, and 107 in the
TFEU.133 It is obvious that the EU competition law as transplanted in the EMAA Article 34 (1),
is to be applied even if the anticompetitive behavior, agreement, or conduct took place within the
Egyptian jurisdiction.
This fact can be perceived as the motive behind the acceleration of adopting competition
legislation in Egypt to avoid the EU competition law implementation within the Egyptian
jurisdiction for long a period of time. This fact responds to the first question on why did Egypt,
among several developing countries, suddenly adopted competition law. One may say, that the
EMAA provision of implementing the EU competition laws even on cases within the Egyptian
jurisdiction is the reason behind the short period between the EMMA commenced on April, 2004
and the adoption of the first Egyptian competition law on February, 2005.
However, as established in the previous chapter, the Egyptian law’s provisions did not transplant
nor did it consider the US and EU competition rules not even when it was required to consider
the EU competition rules by virtue of the EMMA. This seems to be ideal, as the competition law
should benefit from the international norms and provisions applied in practice while
corresponding to its own context. In other words, a competition law should be home grown
rather than exported. However, the Egyptian Law disregarded the important rules and concepts
of tacit collusion, conspiracy, and concerted practices as forms of anticompetitive agreements;
simultaneously, it introduced a partial discouraging immunity system for whistle blowers and
finally the law deprived the ECA from the required independence to fulfil its obligations. The
Presence of such rules is unlikely to correspond to the Egyptian concentrated market and thus it
will not achieve the expected developmental targets. Thus, the contextualization of the Egyptian
law was not aiming for responding to its fading economy, concentrated market, maldistribution
of wealth, and the increased rates of poverty.
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The only logical justification on why did the law omitted such important rules and concepts, is
the presence of the reality constraints offered by the Egyptian political determinants. As
established in the first part of this chapter, the centers of power have dramatically changed
during the past decades of Mubarak’s regime. The oligarchs monopolizing the Egyptian
economy forced themselves into the political sphere. The ruling regime embraced and contained
them within the NDP. The ruling regime and NDP articulated their political rise whether in
cabinets or in Parliament. The trade of was simple, ensure my existence to ensure yours. As the
oligarchs forced themselves as one of the centers of power, the ruling regime must support them
to ensure their political and social support on one hand and to tighten the regime’s grip over the
political sphere on the other hand. Becoming holders of cabinets, legislators in the Parliament
and more importantly monopolizes of the economy, the oligarchs will utilize all their powers to
avoid shrinking their pie. The introduction of a competition law that responds to the Egyptian
context is a great threat to their self-interests preservation and thus they will fight it fiercely.134
In practice, the political elites mutual interests with oligarchies tend to preserve the inadequate
and maldistribution of wealth and power provided by the concentrated market without a healthy
competition. Therefore, both the regime and oligarchs benefit from the fragile economy status
that lacks any sort of competition. Thus, they will focus on the avoidance of any regulatory
legislative that might compromise some of their accumulated wealth and power.135 As Rodriguez
and Mark D. Williams argued, the competition law in developing countries seems to be largely
inappropriate, as the liberal effects of the law will be quickly undermined by interest group
politics procuring protection.136 Eleanor Fox added, “[A]ntitrust law attacks artificial obstruction
that market players create.”137 Accordingly, they are expected to resist the idea of a competition
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legislation that might shrink the size of their aggregate wealth, or in other words the pie. Fox
adds, “government control and indifference to the plight of the excluded – blocks the market
through excessive regulation, privilege, and cronyism. The powerful insiders protect their friends
at the expense of the public and often at the particular expense of the poor.”138 Adam Smith
provided illustrates:
To widen the market and to narrow the competition, is always the interest of the
dealers…The proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes
from this order, ought always to be listened to with great precaution, and ought
never to be adopted till after having been long and carefully examined, not only
with the most scrupulous, but with the most suspicious attention. It comes from
an order of men, whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the public,
who have generally an interest to deceive and even oppress the public, and who
accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it.139
This is applicable in the case of Egypt, as during the adoption of the competition law, the country
lacked democracy, political liberation and economic free participation while it enjoyed cronyism,
state preferred enterprises, and politics monopolization by the NDP. Ahmed Ezz, the close friend
of the ousted president’s son, is the steel monopolist in Egypt, and was the former head of the
political committee of the National Democratic Party.140 Ezz and other oligarch minority are
always eager to widen the market while narrowing the competition and thus they will spare no
efforts or powers to evade the adoption of a legislation that might have the potential to shrink
their pie even if on the long term.
Due to such facts, it is apparent that the ruling regime found itself on shaky grounds. The regime
has to choose between: i) losing the incentives of the financial package stipulated in the EMAA,
ii) sacrificing the possibility of attracting FDI, and iii) hindering its relation with the biggest
trade partner; or iv) signing the EMAA and risks the loss of the oligarchs’ social and political
support that might cost the regime its throne. Due to such political determinants, the regime had
to reach compromises on the internal political arena before entering to the EMAA to yield its
benefits. Accordingly, adopting a contextualized a competition law model that remains on the
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shelves without enforcement stabilizes the internal political arena to preserve oligarchs support
to the regime. Simultaneously, this model even if it is drafted to remains on shelves without
enforcement, fulfils the EMAA requirement which preserves the flow of incentive packages and
financial support of the external trade partner. This is illustrates why the Egypt was suddenly
interested in adopting competition law while it contextualized a model that omits important
concepts and provisions that should be included to ensure that an effective enforcement is most
likely to take place.
The Egyptian case justifies how the political determinants affected the paradigm of any
competition law to be drafted on a developing country with fragile context. The lack of political
liberation, public representation in the decision-making and legislative process, conflict of
interest between politicians monopolizing the political mechanisms and their own investments
interest negatively influenced the Egypt’s competition law paradigm.
With this being said, political determinants is established to play a centric role in both, the preenactment phase by choosing the legislation model and the post enactment phase choosing the
enforcement level.
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V.

Conclusion

This paper penetrates the discussion of why and how developing countries were suddenly eager
to adopt competition legislations during the past couple of decades while they were unable to
enforce it. The paper discusses the main theories provided by the literature regarding such
phenomena. Throughout this discussion, we have established that the most suitable model for the
developing countries is the contextualized model as it corresponds to each of developing
countries unique characteristics. The Egyptian competition law, as one of the developing
countries, was subject to a case study to assess why it is facing enforcement problem. Thus, the
Egyptian competition paradigm was subject to a comparative study analysis including the US
and EU paradigm. This study proved that the Egyptian competition paradigm is isolating itself
from global counter peers.

In addition, this paper examines the contextualization’s theory approach and focuses on the the
most important two context factors, among other factors,141 that are the political and economic
contexts. This paper however, argues that there is one additional factor within the context of the
state which has the power to repress and curb any developmental targets including the protection
of fair competition. This variable is the political determinants which is the result of and the link
between each of the other variables.
The political determinants force itself aggressively on the scene in developing States due to the
fragile context they enjoy. Such fragile context is a natural consequence for the lack of political
liberation, participation in the decision-making, and the waning economic structure that exists in
such states. The presence of high level of corruption leads to cronyism, nepotism, and favoritism
approaches that pave the way for the uprising of the oligarchs’ power and the concentration of
the state’s wealth and power within their hands. All of the foregoing indicates the presence of
certain centers of power that manipulates the State and the public to preserve their own
privileged status. Although the ruling regime might be authoritarian, it is not the sole decision
maker in such states; instead, the regime is only one of the centers of power that creates decision.
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Compromises between the centers of power take place before reaching a deadlock as each center
seeks the preservation of its self-interest and thus they coordinate with each other.
The Egyptian competition paradigm’s isolation was not spontaneous due to the ruling regime’s
lack of expertise or vision; instead, it was intentioned. The rent-seeking approach followed by
the Egyptian state since the 1952 coup focused, and still, on the foreign financial aids
significantly along with the Suez Canal and national resources as the main sources of its budget.
Therefore, pleasing the external trade partners is a top priority. The EU is considered Egypt’s
biggest trade partner and by virtue of the 2004 concluded EMAA, the EU will provide Egypt
with financial package and a free pass for the Egyptian goods to access the EU market, but both
were conditioned by economy reforms. The introduction of a competition law within five years
was one of the required economic reforms stipulated in the EMAA. Within the five years grace
period, the EU transplanted its competition law provisions within the EMAA, which should also
be applied within the Egyptian jurisdiction.
The adoption of competition law is most likely to abolish the market artificial entry and exit
barriers introduced by the oligarchs monopolizing different market sectors. Thus, competition
law might affect their privileged status and they will spare no efforts in utilizing their powers to
avoid adopting such legislation and at the same time to evade being subject to the EU’s
competition provision enforcement.
Accordingly, the ruling regime found itself in between two different interests that need to be
preserved, the external trade partner support with the aids expected to reinforce its declining
budget and the internal oligarch support that provides political and social support stabilizing its
throne. Developing countries usually face such political determinants dilemma. In the Egyptian
case, the ruling regime tended to please both parties and thus in less than one year the, regime,
introduced the Egyptian competition law with the aim to please the external trade partner, while
simultaneously, please the internal forces represented in the oligarchs’ interests. The law was
contextualized in a negative extent that makes the ECA’s mission to enforce it almost
impossible. In addition, the law also ensured that the institution apparatus of enforcing the law is
lacking independence and required funds, which are two of the main reasons provided by the
post-enactment (enforcement mechanism) theory supporters.
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Due to the political determinants, the Egyptian competition paradigm was contextualized not to
the best interest of the public or to achieve developmental targets; rather it was contextualized to
preserve the status quo. It did not respond to its context that is characterized by concentrated
markets, maldistribution of wealth, poverty, lack of participation, cronyism, nepotism, and lack
of political participation. The ruling regime instead opted to contextualize the law to preserve the
persistence of abovementioned characteristics. The common interest of the political and
economic elites prevailed on the expense of the public. The ruling regime and oligarch reached a
win-win situation; compromises were made to ensure that the pie would not shrink.
Compromises are made only when centers of power are reluctant to any change that might affect
their accumulated power. The ruling regime wanted to stabilize its throne while the oligarchs
wanted to preserve their favored status and interests.
With this being said, the case of Egypt proves that the political determinants should be
recognized more in the literature addressing the enforcement problems of developing countries
adopting competition law, especially the supporters of the context theory. Political determinants
matter in the context of any country and more specifically in developing countries and thus need
to be heavily considered.
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